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Abstract. 
In this paper, we considered a discrete time abstract market 
model where the associated commodity is storable. Also, instead of 
assuming expected profit maximizing speculators, we assumed they 
employed mean-variance approaches. 
Within this framework, given a non-degenerate quadratic 
inventory cost function and a linear expectation process, the optimal 
speculative carryover may be decomposed into four components of which 
two are special features arising from mean-variance considerations. 
Furthermore, assuming a linear non-speculative excess demand 
function, Friedman's conjecture (!.� .. profitable speculation 
necessarily stabilizes prices) holds fron an ex ante point of view. 
Speculative Holdings Under Linear Expectation Processes� 
• 
A Mean-Variance Approach 
Da-Hsiang Donald Lien 
!.... Introduction 
There have been several studies that attempt to characterize 
speculators' behavior under linear expectation processes [2] [4]. 
However, these papers assumed that speculators are expected profit 
maximizers, regardless of the riskiness of their market operations. 1 
In this paper, we assume that speculators employ a mean-variance 
approach, and then characterize their impacts on the market again 
assuming a linear expectation process. Within this framework, and 
assuming a linear non-speculative excess demand function. Friedman's 
conjecture holds Ci-�·· profitable speculation necessarily stabilizes 
prices) from an ex ante point of view. 
The plan of this paper is as follows: In section II, we 
describe the market structure and the speculator's problem; in section 
III and IV, dynamic programming is applied to solve the speculator's 
problem and some properties of the solution are exploited. In section 
V, linear expectation rules are introduced. We consider the special 
case when inventory cost is a fixed constant in section VI. The 
general case is dealt with in section VII. 
Non-speculative excess demand is introduced in section VIII. 
Using this, we derive market price behavior and examine Friedman's 
conjecture in section IX. Finally, section X states the conclusions • 
II. Market Structure 
Consider a discrete time spot market, where the associated 
commodity is storable. There is no forward or futures market in this 
commodity, and short-selling in the spot market is prohibited. The 
market opens at time t = 0, 1, 2, • • •  and transactions take place 
immediately thereafter. 
There are three different types of agents in this market: 
producers, speculators and consumers. Producers and consumers as a 
group are called non-speculators. The type of each agent is 
exogeneously determined. We also assume that the decisions of 
producers and consumers are made without considering the effects of 
speculators. Hence, we can treat non-speculative excess demand as 
exogeneously given. Random effects that enter the model either come 
from the production side or the non-speculative demand side, but are 
assumed to be independent of speculators' behavior. 
2 
Each speculator takes prices as given Ci.�·· the case of 
competitive speculation) and he employs a mean-variance approach to 
solve his decision problem, using all information available to him. 
Let St denote the stock level at time t for a specified speculator 
Clater. we'll assume all speculators are identical). Now, at time t, 
the speculator observes the market price Pt and his carryover from the 
previous period St-i· He then constructs a probability density 
function to summarize his expectations about next period's market 
price Pt+l using all available information. From this p.d.f., he
determines his stock level St. Any inventory holding cost h(St) is
assumed to be incurred at time t. 
Let p be the discount factor employed by this speculator and 
let l/2 be the weighting factor of market risk (variance) in his 
objective function. Then, the speculator entering the market at time 
t solves the following problem: 
[CD i-t+l (A) Max p {E[Pi+l(Si - si+l> - h(Si+l)]
CD J.=t {Si}i=t
3 
� � Var [Pi+l(Si - si+l> - h(Si+l)] } + Pt(St-1 - St) - h(St)
where the expectations are taken conditional on his available 
information, hence they are different operators at different points in 
time. Speculators are assumed to be risk averse, hence l > O. 
Before trying to solve (A), we make two further assumptions:2
(1) 2 Var (PtlPt-l) = a  , \I Pt,Pt-l' t = 0, 1, 2, •• • ;
(2) h(S) = c<S;b>
2 
+ d, I,/ S 2 o. Assumption (2) incorporates a
convenience yield effect, i·�·· at stock level b, we achieve minimum 
inventory cost. If there is no convenience yield effect, then minimum 
inventory cost should be achieved at S = 0 which implies b = o.3 (See
[4]). 
III. Optimal Speculative Carryover 
To solve problem (A), assume that lim St = b (equivalently,t-+o 
this says in the limit, the speculator will choose a minimum cost 
inventory stock level), and consider a decision beginning at t = 0. 
Under some regularity assumptions, we can utilize dynamic programming 
to solve the speculator's problem. Specifically, assume at time T, 
* 
the speculator's problem is over and his stock decision is St = b,
\It 2 T. Therefore, at time (T-1), his problem is: 
(Al) Max p[E{PT(ST-l - b)} - � Var {PT(ST-l - b)}]ST-1 
2 
+ 
c(ST-l - b) PT-l(ST-2 - ST-1) - { 2 + d} 
(Note that, at CT-1), PT-l and ST_2 are both known.)
The-first order. condition for (Al) is 
2 * * PET - Pla (ST-l - b) - PT-l - c(ST-l - b) = 0
* 
� ST-1 
PET - PT-l + be
p1a2 + c 
+ � 2 Pla + c
where ET = EPT' the conditional expectation of PT using information 
* about PT-l' and St is the optimal choice of St, t = 0, 1, .•••
(A2) 
Next, at time t = T - 2, his problem becomes 
* l * 
Max p[E{PT-l(ST-2 - ST-1)} - l Var{PT-l(ST-2 - ST-1)}]
ST-2 
2 c(ST_2 - b) + PT-2(ST-3 - ST-2) - { 2 + d} + KO
where K0 is a constant term independent of ST_2•
Since 
4 
•Var {PT-l(ST-2 - ST-1)}
2 PET - PT-l + be + bPA. a Var {PT-l(ST-2 - 2 } PA. a + c 
be + bBA.g2 E(ST-2(PT-l - ET-1) - 2 (PT-1 - ET-1) -PA. a + c 
2 2 a ST-2
P PE - P T-1 _ E[P 
T T-1))}2
PET -(PT-1 PA. a2 + c
2) 2 2(bc + hPh a 
P>..a2 + c
T-1 PA. a2 + c
2ST-2 s - ---T-2 PA. a2 + c
Cov(PT-1' PT-1<PET - PT-1>> +
Kl
where K1 is a constant term independent of ST_2 and ET-l = EPT-l'
therefore the first order condition for (A2) is 
PCE - >..a2s
• 
+ A.(bc + bBA.g
2)a2 
T-1 T-2 2 + PA. a + c 
),, 
2 Cov(P , p "E _ p ) ) } PA. a + c T-1 T-l(P T T-1 
- PT-2 -
• c(ST_2 - b) = 0
2 • bcpia2 � CPA. a + c)ST_2 = PET-l - PT_2 + be + 2 +p>..a + c 
b<na2>2 + >..B 2 2 Cov(PT-l' PT-l(pET-PT-1))PA. a + c PA. a + c 
• PET-1 - PT-2� ST-2 =
2 
+ be {l + BA.g } +2 2 2 PA. a + c PA. a + c PA. a + c 
na2 2 A. B  b( 2 ) + 2 2Cov(PT-l'PT-1<PET - PT-1>>PA. a + c (PA. a + c) 
In general, define f0CPt) = Cov(Pt,PtCPEt+l - Pt)), Vt and
fk{Pt) = Cov{Pt, Ptfk-l (Pt+l)), V k = L 2, • • • , V t. Then we can
state the following theorem: 
5 
Theorem ! 
6 
The optimal speculative stock level which solves (A) under the 
assumption that T is the terminal date is: 
PE - P T-t-1 2 2 s• = t+l t + be [ ( Ph >i + b( Ph > 
T-t
t 2 2 2 2 PA. a + c PA. a + c 1=0 PA. a + c PA. a + c 
BA. T-t-2 BA. i + [ ( 2 ) fi(Pt+l)'Cp>..a2 + c)2 1=0 p>..a + c 
Vt = 0, l, 2, • • • • T-1. 
[Proof] 
( 1) 
The cases t = T-1, T-2 can be checked easily. Now, assume at 
• time t, St satisfies eq. (1). Then at time (t-1) the speculator's
problem is 
. ),, . (A3) max p[E{Pt(St-l - St)} - 2 Var{Pt(St-l - St)}] +st-1 
2 c(St-l - b) 
pt-l(St-2 - St-1) - { 2 + d} + K2
where K2 is a constant term independent of St-l" 
From eq. (1), we
have 
•
Var{Pt(St-l - St)}
= E{(Pt - Et)St-1 
be 
P>..a2 + c
T-t-1 2 . 
[ ( pia )1(P _ E ) _2 t t 1=0 PA. a + c 
2 
b{ P6a )
T-t(Pt - Et) - 2
1 (PtCPEt+l - Pt) -p>..a2 + c PA. a + c 
E[PtCPEt+l - Pt)] )
2 E[Ptfi(Pt+l)] )} 
� T-t-2 BA. i 
2 2 [ ( 2 ) (Ptfi(Pt+l) -p>..a + c> x=o p>..a + c 
2 T-t-1 . 2 
= a2s2 _ 2bcq [ dJ.S _ 2b ( Ua ) T-ta2 _ t-l j3la2 + c J.=l t-l j3la2 + c 
2 Cov(P p (AE 
j3la2 + c t
• t � t+l - Pt)) -
2Bl T-t-2 . [ ( Bl )J. C (P 
(j3la2 + c)2 i=O j3la2 + c 
ov t' Ptfi(Pt+1>>
2 2 2bca2 T-t-1 . a St-1 - 2 
[ dJ.S - 2bdT-ta2
j3la + c i=O t-l 
2 
13la2 + c
fo(Pt> -
2Bl T-[t-2 Bl . 
2 (--"""--) 
1f. (P )
(j3la + c)2 i=O j3la2 + c i+l
 t 
where d = j3la2 /(j3la2 + c). Therefore, the first order condition for
(A3) is: 
T-t-1 . 2 • "'�' _2 J3 {E - la S + --""-""-t t-1 2 ) d
1 + bla2dT-t + l f (P ) +
�o __ 2 o t 13la + c 
Bl2 T-t-2 . [ ( Bl )J. 
• 
(j3la2 + c)2 J.=0 j3la2 + c 
fi+l(Pt)} - pt-1 - c(St-1 - b) = 0
7 
• 
=9 st-1 
j3E - p t t-1 be Bl 2
2 + 2 + be 
a 
j3la + c j3la + c (j3la2 + c)2
T-t-1 . 2 
[ di + b P;a dT-t +
J.=0 j3la + c 
� {fo(Pt) 2 )2 (j3la + c 
j3Et - pt-1 +• 
- 2 =9 st-1 - j3la + c
T-t-2 
+ [ ( Bl ) i+lf (P ) }
i=O j3la2 + c i+l t 
T-t be [ .K -- a· + 
j3la2 + c k:O 
T-t-1 
[ ( Bl )Kf (P ) 
K:O j3la2 + c K t 
• bd
T-t+l + _____l!1. 
(j3la2 + c)2
by letting K i + 1. Therefore, the proof is completed. 
Q.E.D. 
Eq. (1) expresses the optimal speculative stock level as the 
summation of four terms: (1) the current expected profit effect 
j3Et+l - pt pi 2 T-t 
2 ; (2) the terminal convenience yield effect b( 2
q ) ; 
j3la + c j3la + c 
(3) the cost-factor-and-convenience-yield interaction effect 
b T-t-1 pi 2 . _c __ � ( a )J.2 2 j3la + c =O j3la + c 
and (4) the covariance risk effect 
T-t-2 Bl i 
� 
[ ( 2 ) f i (P t+l) • (j3la2 + c) J.=0 j3la + c 
8 
Among these four effects, (2) vanishes as T approaches infinity, while 
(3) and (4) are special features arising because the mean-variance 
approach is used to describe the speculator's preferences. These will 
be discussed further in the following section. 
IV. Properties of the Optimal Stock Level
First, note that in the derivations leading to eq. (1), we 
• implicitly assumed St 2 O. However, since short selling is not
allowed, the optimal speculative stock level should be written as 
A • • st = max(St' 0) for every t > O; and if we have t', such that St, < 0,
• 
then all formulas for St' t � t' now are invalid. This introduces a
complex discontinuity into the problem. In the general case, we will 
• 
simply assume St 2 O. [There are some special cases, however, in
• which St 2 O can be proved (!.� • • the case where c = O )] • 
Second, assume l = 0 and let T approach infinity. Then eq. 
(1) reduces to the case considered in [4] , !-�·· all competitive 
speculators are expected-profit maximizing agents. Hence, eq. (1) 
• 
becomes st 
j3E - p t+l t + b since the terminal convenience yield c 
effect (2) and covariance risk effect (4) both vanish when l = 0, 
T -7 =, and the interaction effect becomes b. There is one period 
time-lag difference between our model and that used in [4] as to when 
the inventory cost occurs. Adjusting for this, we obtain the optimal 
stock level derived in [4], which is therefore a special case of our 
model. 
Third, note that eq. (1) holds when T is the terminal date. 
But to solve (A), we must let T approach infinity which creates 
convergence problems. O• 
2 
-� Note that if c > 0, then 0 < d = u;v \ i, 
PA. a + c 
and convergence problems only arise from the covariance risk effect. 
However, if ·c 0 <1.� • • there are no variable inventory costs), then 
all the terms except (2) require further consideration. 
The last points we want to make are about the interaction 
effect and the covariance risk effect. Each of these is a discounted 
sum of a sequence but using apparently different discount rates, 
2� and �1 respectively. This is somewhat misleading. 
PA.a + c PA. a  + c
When we introduce fK(") into eq. (1), it turns out that both
81� expressions involve the same discount rate d = 2 p1a + c 
If we let 
b = 0 or c = 0, then the interaction effect vanishes (but the 
covariance risk effect remains). As for fK("), these functions all
take the covariance operator form. For example, 
f0CPt) = Cov(Pt' PtCPEt+l - Pt)) is the covariance between price and
expected profit for the next period ; 
fK(Pt) Cov(Pt' PtfK-l(Pt+l))
9 
Cov(Pt' PtCov(Pt+l'pt+lfK_2<Pt+2>> = • 
Cov(Pt,PtCov(Pt+l'pt+lCov(Pt+2'
Cov(Pt+K' Pt+K(pEt+K+l - pt+K)) 
measures the covariance between price and expected profit K periods 
later (by updating information at each subsequential future period). 
10 
Therefore, we named (4) as the covariance risk effect. Note that this 
effect comes across time, rather than across alternatives at a point 
in time (which leads to a covariance risk effect in the Capital Asset 
Pricing Models). 
][,,_ Linear Expectation Rule 
Now, assume every speculator is identical with price 
expectation formation equation given by: 
P� = & + 11P t-l + et, \I t (2) 
where 11 is the price expectation adjustment coefficient, &/(l 11) is 
the long-run rational expectations equilibrium price, {et} is a
sequence of identically independently distributed random variables 
with E(et1Pt_1> = 0, Var(etlPt_1> = a
2 and E(e! IPt-l) = O <1.� • •  the 
probability density function of et is symmetric with respect to zero),
\I t. When 11 > 1, we say the speculator is responsive; when 11 < 1, we 
say he is unresponsive. 
Using (2), we can determine fK(Pt) for every K 2 0. For
example, 
fO(Pt) Cov(Pt,Pt(pEt+l - Pt)) Cov(Pt.Pt(p& + Cp11 - l)Pt))
2 2 = Poa + Cpa - 1) Cov(Pt,Pt)
= Poa2 + (pa - l)E{et"[2(o + aPt_1)et + e� - a21J
2 = {po + 2Cpa - l)(o + aPt_1>Ja 
also, 
f1CPt) = Cov(Pt,Ptf0(Pt+l)) = Cov(Pt,Pt(po + 2(pa - l)(o
= a4{po + 2(Pa - l)o} + 2a2Cpa - l)a Cov(Pt,P�)
= {po + 2Cpa - l)o·+ 2a(pa - l)(o + aPt_1)Ja
4 
In general, we can prove the following theorem: 
Theorem 2 
Under the linear expectation rule (eq. (2)), 
K+l . l fk(Pt) = [p6 + 2o(pa - 1) L aJ
- +
J=l K+l 2K+2 
2 + aPt))a )
11 
2a (pa - l)Pt_1}a , V K, V Pt. (3) 
[Proof] 
The cases where K = O and K = 1 can be easily checked. Now, 
assume for K = i, fk(Pt) satisfies eq. (3), hence
fi+l(Pt) = Cov(Pt,Ptfi(Pt+l))
i+l -1 i+l 2i+2 Cov(Pt,Pt(po + 6 [ 2(Pa - l)a
j + 2a (pa - l)Pt)a )J=l 
{po + 6
i�12cpa - l)aj-l}a2i+4 + 2ai+l(pa - l)a2i+2cov(Pt,P�)
J=l 
{ps + s
i
[
+1
2Cpa - l)aj-1Ja2i+4 + 2Cpa - l)ai+1a2i+4Co + aP >t-1 J=l 
1+2 . 
{po + 2o (pa - 1) [ aJ-1 + 2(pa - 1) ai+2p } a2i+4
J=l 
t-1 • 
12 
which completes the proof. 
• 
st 
Substituting eq. (3) into eq. (1), we have 
PE - P T-t-1 2 2 t+l t + be � ( BAa )i + b( B4a )T-t + 2 2 2 2 PAa + c PAa + c =O PAa + c PAa + c 
ua2 
T-t-2 
( 
pia2 ) i.
CPAa2 + c>2 �O PAa2 + c 
i+l . 1 i 1 {po + 2o(Pa - 1) [ aJ- + 2a + Cpa - l)Pt}.J=l 
Q.E.D. 
( 4) 
• The next problem we consider is conditions under which St will
converge as T � "'· 
VI. Zero Variable Inventory Cost 
• 
st 
When c = 0, eq. (4) becomes 
PEt+l -
2PA a 
i+l Pt T-t-2 � 2o(B _ l) i+l ._1 2a (pa - )Pt + b + [ { + a � aJ + } 2 2 2 i=O PAa PAa =1 PAa 
13 
( flEt+l - pt + b + 
T-t-2 
) {--6.L + 21HBa - 1) 
i+l 
1 _ gi+l 2a (fla - l)Pt 
1 - a + 2 }.f1Aa2 f=o fl Aa2 fl Aa2 flAa 
if a F 1 
flEt+l - pt T-t-2 �& 26(8 - 1)(" + 1) 2(fl - l)Pt + b + '\ £...lUL.. + l. + } • 2 I- 2 2 2 flAa i=O flAa flAa flAa 
if a =  1 
Theorem 3 
• 
( 4') 
Given c = 0, assume & F 0. Then if T 4 co, St is unbounded
for every t. 
[Proof] 
• Obviously, when a = 1, & F 0, T 4 '°• then St 4 -co. On the
• other hand. if a F 1, then for St to be bounded, we must require that:
i+l 
(1) a< 1 and (2) lim � + 2&(Ba ; l) • 11- _a a = 0. Now, (2)i� flAa flAa 
implies fl(l - a) + 2(fla - 1) = 0 � fl(a + 1) = 2, contradicting 
a, fl < 1. • Hence St is unbounded when & F 0, T 4 ...  
O.. E.D. 
• 
Although St is unbounded from below, yet since short selling
is prohibited, St must be non-negative. Hence the optimal stock 
A * 
St = max(St' O) is either ... or O when & F o and T 4 ...  This implies
14 
Corollary 1 
A A 
Given c = 0, O i St < ...  I,/ t and St > O for some t implies
one of the following conditions: 
(i) & 0, a < 1 
(ii) T is finite. 
Corollary 2 
A Given c = 0, & = 0, a < 1. and T 4 ... implies St = o, I,/ t.
Corollary 1 and 2 show that with zero variable inventory 
holding costs, when T 4 ...  and short selling is prohibited, then the
speculator either accumulates unbounded stocks or no stocks at all, 
1·�·· speculators are either highly active or totally inactive. For 
example, when & = 0, a < 1, they always hold z ero stock. In the other 
cases, when & F 0, they might switch from an unbounded stock to z ero 
at some points, and then remain for few periods, finally they switch 
from zero to an unbounded level of stocks. This implies they are 
highly active. 
Theorem 4 
Given c = o. when T < ... , any time-independent linear
expectation of speculators won't be fulfilled • 
The proof of Theorem 4 involves the structure of non-
speculative excess demand, therefore we'll put it into the Appendix 
after the introductions of market demand structure. Nonetheless, the 
reason we state Theorem 4 here is to claim that "T < =" is also not a 
useful assumption to avoid the "unboundedness" problems that arise 
when c = O.  In the following sections, c F O is assumed. 
VII. Properties of the Optimal Stock Level
When c F 0, eq. (4) can be written as: 
* 
st 
PEt+l - pt + Mlt + M2t + M3t + M4t + MstP>..a2 + c 
where 
Mlt
M2t 
M3t 
M4t
MSt
and 
be . 2 . P>..a + c 
1 - l-t 
1 - " • 
= bdT-t
d 
2 2 8 &A. a  • 1 _ 4T-t-1 
2 
• 
P>..a + c 1 - d 
2&Clla lll!A.g2 T-t-2 .
<P>..a2 + c)2 ko 
d1
T-t-2 . 
i
l....=...Jl: where a F 11 - a • 
2§(11 - lll!>..a2 
CP>..a2 + c>2
2 
[ rJ1(i + 1), when a =  1
1=0 
2P>..a <Pa - l)Pt 
cp>..a2 + c>2
8>..a2 
Cp>.. a2 + c)
T-t-2 
[ ai+ldi
1=0 
Hence, as T 4 =, beM 4 --2 1t p>..a + c 
1 
1 - d = b; M2t 4 0; 
2 2 
M3t 4 II
 §Aq • 1 
2 
---
PA. a + c 1 - d 
82&Aa2 
c(p>..a2 + c)
and 
15 
MSt 4 
M4t 4 
2 2aP>..a (pa - l)Pt all a2 , when < 1 
CP>..a2 + c)[(l - a)p>..a2 + c] p>..a2 + c
2 aUa =, when 2 2 1P>..a + c 
2 2 2&Clla - l)l!A.g _ 2&Clla - 1)8>..g 
c(l - a) CP>..a2 + c) (1 - a) Cp>..a2 + c) [(1 - a)p>..a2 
2 alll.a when a F 1 and 2 < 1P>..a + c 
2alll.a ± = when a F 1 and 2 2 1 P>..a + c 
2 20(8 - l)8A.g when a = 1
c2 
+ c] 
2 
Note that when a = L all2
l.a < 1 is satisfied. Therefore, we have 
P>..a + c
the following theorem: 
Theorem S 
2 2 * Assume T 4 =. If ap>..a 2 PA.a + c, then St is unbounded.
* Furthermore, whether St = = or -= depends on M4t and Mst· 
On the 
other hand, if aP>..a2 < P>..a2 + c, then as T 4 =, s; will converge to
where 
-
(pa - l)Pt (J + alll4a2 + cSt - M + 2 [ 2 ] PA.a + c (1 - a)PA. a + c 
2 2 
M = 8§ + 8 Ha + b +
P>..a2 + c c(p>..a2 + c)
16 
and 
M 
2&(Ba - l)Bla2 2&CBa - 1)Bla2 
c(l - a)(Pla2 + c)
when a fo 1;
c(l - a)(Pla2 + c)[(l - a)pla2 + cl 
B& 
Pla2 + c 
+ 
2 2 2 B &la + b + 2§ CB - 1) BA.g 2 2 ' cCPla + c) c 
when a = 1. 
Corollary 3 
Given aPla2 < Pla2 + c, St > 0 implies
(i) ast/ab = 1, \/ t. 
(ii) sgn(aSt/aPt) = sgn(pa - 1), \/ t. 
[Proof] 
(i) is obvious. For (ii), if a< l, then 
- 2 sgn(ast/aPt) = sgn(pa - 1) < o. since 1 - a > o and p, a, a , c > o. 
If a > 1, then since aPla2 < Pla2 + c =9 c + (1 - a)pla
2 > 0, hence
sgn(aSt/aPt) = sgn(pa - 1). \/ t.
17 
Q.E.D. 
Theorem 5 shows that {St] is the solution for problem (A) when
2 2 -aPla < Pla + c and c > O (note that, by hypothesis, St 2 0, \/ t),
therefore the optimal speculative stock level is fully characteriz ed. 
Otherwise, we always have St 
= m or O. Corollary 3 shows that as the 
minimum-cost stock level b changes by one unit, the optimal stock 
level St also changes by one unit in the same direction for every t.
Furthermore, when the current price Pt changes, which direction St
18 
will change is determined by the sign of (pa - 1). 
VIII. Market Price Behavior
Now, since we take the behavior of non-speculators as given, 
we can summarize their impacts on the market by a non- speculative 
excess demand function. Following [4), we postulate a linear non-
speculative excess demand function of the form: 
Dt = -aPt + Yt• a > 0 
where {yt] is a sequence of identically independently distributed
random variables with E(yt) = µ, Var(yt) = V. 
By the market clearing condition;4 we have 
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This proves: 
Theorem 6 
Given c F 0, ajH.a2 < jH.a2 + c, 0 � St < .., I,/ t,
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Since we want price to be non-negative, we make the following 
assumptions: (i) w > 0 and (ii) P0 > !· Therefore, for lwl 
need O < _z_ < 1 � z < 0 � pa < 1, since (1 - a)PAa2 + c z - a 
< 1, we 
> o. 
Now, if c > (1 - P)Aa2, then PAa2 + c > Aa2 � 1 + _c > 1 
PAa2 p
' hence
2 
a < BAg + c l=9 a < �which establishes the following:
PAa2 � 
Theorem 7 
2 * Assume a > 1. If c > Cl - P)Aa , then St bounded and
lim EP t, lim VarP t unbounded do not violate market clearing. Undert-+o t-+o 
this configuration, the action of competitive speculators will 
destabilize prices. 
As to whether the speculator's expectations will be fulfilled, 
we can compare eq. (6) and eq. (2) to derive the following theorem: 
Theorem 8 
( i) 
Fulfilling of speculator's expectation implies: 
__ z_ 
z - a = a and (ii) � = o + et wherea - z 
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2 2 ' PAa + c (1 - a)PAa + c
and (ii) holds for every t 1. 2, • • •. 
Corollary 4 
If speculator's expectations are fulfilled, then 
(i) a< 1, (ii) µ = S(a - z) , (iii) v2 =(a - z) 2a2• 
[Proof] 
Assume a = 1, then fulfilling expectation implied � = 1 z-a 
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� z = z - a � a = 0, contradiction. On the other hand, if a > 1, 
z then (z - .a) =a 
ast � z > a > O and ap- = z > a.
t 
Therefore, as 
Pt � m, St � m which is unbounded. Since we only dealt with bounded 
St' hence a < 1 is required. (ii) and (iii) are derived from 
rt E(� 
rt E(S +st) and Var<;-=-z> = Var(S +st) •  respectively (where 
expect�tions are conditional on available information) .  
Q.E.D. 
Therefore, when speculator's expectations are fulfilled, EPt• 
VarPt and Cov(Pt,Pt-h) are all bounded. 
* Also, St is bounded. 
IV. Profitable Speculation 
In this section, we turn to Friedman's conjecture, i.� .. 
profitable speculation· necessarily stabilizes prices. Recall taht, in 
problem (A) , St= b, Vt is a feasible strategy, therefore, any 
strategy {St} with St f b for some t certainly incurs positive profits 
(actually, the profits must be high enough to cover the losses from 
change in variances) . From Theorem 5, this implies M + zPt f b for 
some t which is easily to be satisfied. 
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Now, from Theorem 7, when a> 1, there would be destabilizing 
profitable speculation. However, in this case, the speculator's 
expectations won't be fulfilled. On the other hand, when their 
expectations are fulfilled, a < 1 and 
VarPt 
(1 - w)V . (l _ w2t) < ...Y. 
a2(1 + w) a2 
(since a< 1 � z < O � 0 < w = �z� < 1) , where V2 = VarPt when z - a a 
there are no speculators. Therefore, 
Theorem 9 
At a rational expectations equilibrium Ci.�· · speculators' 
expectations are fulfilled) , and given a linear non-speculative excess 
demand, profitable speculation always stabilizes prices. 
Theorem 9 leaves it open whether at a rational expectations 
equilibrium with non-linear non-speculative excess demand. profitable 
speculation always stabilizes prices. Because of earlier results (see 
[1], [3], [6]) , it seems unlikely that Friedman's conjecture will hold 
with non-linear excess demands, however. 
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.!.:. Conclusion 
In this paper, speculators are taken to be risk averse, and a 
mean-variance approach was employed. Under this approach, the optimal 
stock level for speculators has been derived. Nonetheless, this stock 
level might be unbounded. ·To carry the analysis further, we found 
when marginal inventory cost is zero, speculators are either hightly 
active (St==) or inactive (St= 0). To resolve the problem of 
unboundedness of St when c = 0 requires either the assumption that the 
long-run equilibrium price equals zero (which le�ds to St = 0, V t) 
or the assumption of finite horizon (in which case speculators' 
expectations won't be fulfilled5). 
On the other hand, when the inventory carrying cost function 
is of a non-degenerate quadratic form, one possible equilibrium 
configuration involves bounded stock levels and unbounded prices, with 
the expectation adjustment coefficient greater than 1. However, this 
won't constitute a rational expecations equilibrium.6 When a rational 
expectations equili_ exists given linear non-speculative excess 
demand, the stock level is bounded, price is also bounded, and 
Friedman's conjecture is verified, !-�· · profitable speculation 
necessarily stabilizes prices. 
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 4 
By inspecting eq. (2) and eq. (4'), we know that unless 
pa - 1 = 0, speculator's expectations won't be fulfilled, since in 
2 4 
(4'), price terms involve multiplicative time factors when pa F 1. On 
the other hand, when pa - 1 = 0, then 
s* = ...l!.L + b + ...l!.LcT - t - 1> t PA.a2 pia2 
= ...l!.LcT - t) + b 2. 0, V t � T 
PA.a2 
• • Ii � st-l - st = 2. v t � T A.a 
Therefore, the market clearing condition becomes 
Ii - aPt + 'Yt = 2·A.a 
'Yt Ii � pt= - -
--. 
a aA.a2 
Vt� T 
Vt� T 
Now, for expectations to be fulfilled, we need a = 0 which contradicts 
Pa - 1 = O.  Hence, the proof i s  completed. 
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Footnotes 
* I am indebted to James Quirk for helpful discussions and editings,
also to Richard McKelvey for comments on earlier drafts. All 
errors, of course, remain mine. 
1. On the other hand, both Sarri s [5] and Turnovsky [7] employed 
2. 
mean-variance approach to determine one-period optimal stock 
level, without taking account the dynamic effects. 
The assumption Var(Pt lPt-l) = 2 a ' V t can be relaxed to 
Var(Pt 1Pt_1> = a� which is a constant term independent of Pt' 
Pt-l' but might change over time. Under this assumption, the 
results can be easily adjusted to characterize the optimal stock 
level. Nonetheless, the market price process will be highly 
complexized and difficult to proceed. 
3. Note that, suppose instead of quadatic form, we use linear form 
for inventory cost function. Thus, when b = O (!.�·· no 
convenience yield), the inventory cost curve is a straight line 
over Co.�>. However, if b fo 0, then we have to introduce a kinked
point in inventory cost curve. 
4. Stri ctly speaking, the left-hand side of market clearing equation 
should be multiplied by the number of representative speculators, 
but without loss of generality, we set this factor to be one. 
5. In the one-period framework, considering all the agents in the 
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market, Turnovsky [7] showed that constant marginal inventory cost 
may lead to nonexistence of rational expectations equilibrium in 
futures market as well. 
6. Without considering the "unboundedness" problem of optimal stock 
level, when a > 1 and the speculator's expectation is fulfilled, 
the optimal stock level will increase monotonically over time. 
Therefore, there will never be realized profits. 
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